Equity in healthcare is an important policy objective of the Canadian healthcare system. Out-of-pocket payments for healthcare (OPPH) by Canadian households account for a substantial share of total healthcare expenditures. Using data from Statistics Canada's Survey of Household Spending (SHS, n = 33,367), this study examined the progressivity and catastrophic effect of OPPH in Canada over the period 2010 to 2015 inclusive. The Kakwani Progressivity Index (KPI) was used to measure the progressivity of OPPH for each year of the study period. The catastrophic effect of OPPH was calculated using a threshold of 10% of total household consumption. The computed KPI indicated that OPPH are a regressive source of healthcare funding in Canada and the regressivity of OPPH has increased over the study period. This indicates that the distribution of OPPH in Canada is not equitable and the percentage contribution of households from their total consumption to healthcare as OPPH decreases as their consumption increase. The results also suggested that 7% of Canadian households face catastrophic outof-pocket payments for healthcare (COPPH) over the study period. The proportion of households with COPPH was higher in rural areas compared with urban areas over the study period. Policies to enhance financial risk protection among low-income and rural households are required to improve equity in healthcare financing in Canada.
Introduction
Equity is widely regarded as an important policy objective in both developed and developing countries [1] [2] [3] [4] , and the equitable distribution of healthcare financing and utilization is an important political objective of many governments throughout the world [5, 6] . Nonetheless, countries at all stages of development experience the prominent issue of equity in healthcare [7] .
There are different philosophies toward equity in healthcare systems in different countries around the world. The World Health Organization (WHO) [8] states that equity in healthcare includes equitable financing through fair prepayment and protection against catastrophic payments and equitable access to healthcare services. One of the more universal principles of equity in healthcare is the idea that healthcare system payments should be financed according to ability-to-pay (ATP), rather than according to the risk of illness, and distributed according to need [6] . Based on these two principles, equity in the healthcare context can be reviewed from two perspectives: equity in healthcare utilization and equity in healthcare financing.
Equity in healthcare financial contribution and protection against financial losses is a common challenge for healthcare systems [8, 9] . Health systems are typically financed through four sources: general taxation, social insurance, private insurance, and out-of-pocket payments. General taxation and social insurance are state-financing methods, whereas private insurance and out-of-pocket payments are Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (https ://doi.org/10.1007/s1019 8-019-01074 -x) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
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the responsibility of the users. Health service users typically access full prepayment or subsidized health services through state-sponsored financing methods [6, 10] . The unpredictable nature of healthcare needs contributes to the global challenge of equity in healthcare financial contribution and protection against catastrophic payments, especially when the burden of payment falls onto users of differing ATP [10, 11] .
There are two primary ways in which out-of-pocket payments for healthcare (OPPH) can be unfair for households. First, households can incur catastrophic out-of-pocket payments for healthcare (COPPH, for example, prescription drug costs for cancer treatment) at the point of care that are not covered under any insurance or prepayment scheme. Second, health system financing can impose payments that are regressive (i.e., the percentage contribution of households/individuals from their ATP to OPPH decrease as their incomes increase) in nature [10] . Minimizing OPPH and relying mostly on insurance or prepayment schemes, while featuring progressive or proportionate payments, with respect to income, through a tax-based healthcare financing system can lead to equitable and effective financing of a health system [8, 9] Although equity is considered an important policy objective of the Canadian healthcare system, relatively few empirical studies (e.g., [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] ) have examined equity in healthcare financing in Canada, across provincial jurisdictions, and for various types of OOPH that affect Canadians households. These studies have generally examined equity in OOPH in terms of average equivalized dollar amounts in proportion to household income quintiles, as well as limiting their investigations to certain types of OOPH. Notwithstanding the important contributions of these studies, there has been no comprehensive study of equity in healthcare financing in Canada using contemporary measures of distribution such as the Concentration index and the Kakwani Progressivity Index (KPI) for all types of OOPH. Furthermore, the catastrophic effect of OPPH in Canada has not been examined extensively for OOPH outside of pharmaceutical drugs. Thus, this paper features two novel and pressing investigations to fill these identified gaps in Canadian healthcare literature. First, it assesses the equity of healthcare financing in Canada by analyzing the progressivity of OPPH in Canada over the period 2010-2015. Specifically, for the first time, the paper uses the KPI to quantify of the degree of progressivity of all types of OOPH in the Canadian context using the most recent available data. Second, it examines COPPH faced by Canadians over the study period. The analysis of equity in healthcare financing in Canada provides valuable important information to policy makers and inform the vital decisions to improve equity in healthcare financing in Canada.
Equity and the Canadian healthcare system
Equity in healthcare financing represents a pervasive political concern for the federal and provincial governments of Canada. Although not named explicitly in legislation, healthcare equity is embedded in the Canadian universal healthcare system. The federal and provincial governments have different responsibilities in the equitable financing and delivery of healthcare. Sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 divide the legislative powers of the federal and provincial governments, respectively [18, 19] . Notably, the provincial governments are responsible "the establishment, maintenance, and management of hospitals…" and "generally all matters of a merely local or private nature in the province", which the courts have interpreted to mean the oversight of healthcare in the province [18, 19] .
Although health is the primary responsibility of the provinces, the federal government influences health policy and contributes to the financing of "medically necessary" healthcare services through the Canada Health Act [CHA] . The CHA states that the primary objective of federal healthcare policy in the country is "… to facilitate reasonable access to health services without financial or other barriers" [20] . The federal government provides the provinces with cash transfers should they follow the program criteria outlined in the CHA; this financial arrangement is also the primary function of the CHA [19, 20] . The five CHA program criteria are universality, public administration, comprehensiveness, portability, and accessibility [20] . Through the criteria of 'universality' and 'accessibility', the CHA created the legal basis for equity in healthcare for all citizens and permanent residents in Canada, regardless of the province of residence. Notwithstanding the CHA principles enforced by the federal government, there is the potential for interprovincial variations in the equity of healthcare financing because of the individual responsibilities of provincial governments to deliver services inside Medicare and regulate those services outside of Medicare coverage [21] [22] [23] . Canada's healthcare system is based on the principle that healthcare should be financed according to ATP and should be utilized based on need [19, 22, 24] although differences in interprovincial health service management and federal-provincial government powers form the basis by which healthcare inequities are considered. OPPH in Canada are a method of funding those services that fall outside of publicly insured healthcare services [23] .
The significant contribution of OPPH in the Canadian healthcare system represents a troubling problem for Canadians. The Canadian Institute of Health Information (CIHI) found that healthcare expenditure contributions from the public and private sectors (healthcare expenditures by households and private insurance companies) in Canada have remained relatively stable since the 1990s, with the public-sector contributing around 70% of total annual health expenditures and the rest by the private-sector [25] . OPPH by Canadian households represents the largest portion of private healthcare expenditures and accounted for 14.2% of total healthcare expenditure in 2015 [25] . Although the relative contribution of private spending from total healthcare expenditures has remained stable in Canada, OPPH have increased over time. The increasing trend in OPPH can place undue financial barriers on Canadian families, especially when these payments become catastrophic. Financial barriers and lack of financial protection from COPPH can lead to cost-related non-adherence of "medically necessary" services and interventions [26] . OPPH have been found to represent a heavy burden to low-income Canadians, and this burden can lead to decreased utilization of healthcare services and needed pharmaceutical drugs [22, 26, 27] . Cost-related non-adherence to prescription medications is a tangible example of the prominent public health issue of inequity in Canadian healthcare financing brought on by OPPH [26, 27] .
Data
To measure the progressivity and catastrophic effect of OPPH in Canada, data were gathered from the confidential master files of the SHS conducted by Statistics Canada. The SHS is an active survey that obtains detailed information about household spending in Canada and is collected annually. The target population of the SHS is the population of Canada's 10 provinces and excludes residents of federal institutions and members of the Canadian Forces, as well as those living on Indian reserves [28] . Overall, collection exclusions account for 2.5% of the Canadian population. The SHS typically collects information on the amounts of food, transportation, clothing, shelter, healthcare, and other expenditures to better understand household spending in Canada. Data were mainly collected through a personal interview and a diary of daily expenses, while other sources such as receipts and tax information from the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) supplement the principle survey data. Statistics Canada uses a stratified two-stage sampling design for the SHS, where the first stage is a sample of geographic clusters and the next are a sample of the dwellings within each cluster [28] . Validation practices and standardized data protocols employed by Statistics Canada reduce the risk of statistical bias and ultimate support high data quality.
Data from the SHS for the purposes of this analysis were available from 1998 to 2015; however, there have been some changes to the SHS that affect its comparability over time. Specifically, starting from the SHS 2010, an interview and expense diary were introduced to collect household expenditures. These changes to the collection methodology limit their comparability to versions before 2010 [29] . Statistics Canada also cautions users of these data about the comparability regarding the data set break [30] . In response to this break in the data set, the SHS from 2010-2015 (n = 33,367) were used to in the study. These years are the most recent, available iterations of the SHS after the change in survey methodology. The response rate for both the interview and expense diary was between 47 and 39% for each individual reference year [28] . Table  A. 1 in the supplementary file shows the number of observations from each SHS across the study period.
Variables
Household consumption from the SHS was used as a proxy for ATP in the study. This is because the income of households is more volatile than their consumption; although household income can vary, household consumption tends to remain steady over time [4, 31] . In addition, the income of households tends to be underreported in surveys, whereas household consumption tends to be reported more precisely [32, 33] . OPPH in the study was defined as direct out-of-pocket expenditures for healthcare (eyecare, pharmaceutical drugs, dental goods and services, physician services, non-physician services, and all other healthcare goods and services), which exclude other private expenditure such as private insurance payments. Both household consumption and healthcare expenditure were equivalized to take into account differences in household size, ensuring proper comparison [4, 31] . There is no universally accepted method for determining equivalence scales. Thus, similar to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) publications (e.g., [34, 35] ), the square root scale, which divides household consumption/ OPPH by the square root of household size, was used to equivalize household consumption/OPPH. The generally accepted 10% threshold of household consumption in developed countries was used to determine the catastrophic burden of OPPH in households [4, 36] . As per Statistics Canada's definition [28] , rural residential regions were defined as population centres with less than 30,000 people, and all other regions with lower population density. Urban residential regions were defined as population centres with 30,000 people or more. All analyses utilized a sample weight provided by Statistics Canada to ensure that the results are representative of the Canadian population.
Methods

Measuring progressivity in out-of-pocket payments for healthcare
The assessment of progressivity in OPPH requires measurement of the extent to which OPPH are related to individuals' ATP. We employed the KPI [37] to assess the inequality of OPPH in Canada. As a summary measure of the progressivity, the KPI for OPPH can be defined as twice the area between the Lorenz curve of the income distribution and the Concentration curve of OPPH distribution. The Lorenz (Concentration) curve is a graph with horizontal axis showing the cumulative share of the individuals in the population ranked according to income against the corresponding cumulative share of income (OPPH) in the vertical axis. If OPPH are distributed in perfect proportion to income, the Lorenz curve and the Concentration curve for OPPH will overlap [4, 10] . If households OPPH rise disproportionately with income, the Concentration curve lies outside of the Lorenz curve. Conversely, if households OPPH decrease disproportionately with income, the Concentration curve lies inside of the Lorenz curve [4, 10] .
Formally, KPI = C h − G y , where the C h is the Concentration index for OPPH and the G y is the Gini coefficient for income [6, 38] . The C h ( G y ) is defined as twice the area between the Concentration (Lorenz) curve and the line of perfect equality (the 45° diagonal line). A negative value of the KPI for OPPH would suggest that OPPH are regressive and a positive value of the KPI would suggest that they are progressive. The value of zero indicates that OPPH are the proportional source of funding in healthcare [6, 39] . Further explanation of the KPI can be found in Figure A .1 of the supplementary file. The KPI for OPPH can be measured using the following single-step Eq. (1): where h i is the OPPH of household i , is the mean of OPPH for total households, y i is the income of household i , η is its mean of income of all households, 2 r is the variance of the fractional rank, r i , and i is a stochastic error term. The ordinary least square (OLS) estimate of δ is the KPI [4] .
Measuring catastrophic out-of-pocket payments for healthcare
The two main components of catastrophic payments are total household OPPH and some measure of household ATP, typically income or consumption [4] . Household income, expenditure, and consumption are all common measures that operationalize the construct of ATP [4] .
COPPH is typically defined as exceeding a certain fraction of household ATP (or proxy thereof) in a given period, usually 1 year. This approach allows for the approximation of the disruptive effect of health expenditures on material living standards, specifically because large household expenditures on health must be at the expense of other goods and services [4] . Catastrophic payments can be defined in relation to the health payment budget share. Although this method is used extensively in the literature, a consensus on a common or universal definition of catastrophic payments for healthcare has not been reached in the literature. Studies have included thresholds ranging from 3% of household budget share to 40% of the capacity to pay (see, [12, 13, 33, 36, [40] [41] [42] ). Canadian studies that have undertaken investigations into equity in healthcare and pharmaceutical financing tend to use thresholds between 3 and 10% of household budget share. Furthermore, Statistics Canada and other government agencies typically use 5% of household disposable income as a threshold representing the burden of OOP expenditures [14, 43] . Although the previous studies defined catastrophic health expenditure in different ways, it is generally accepted that 10% of household consumption is the most accurate indicator of catastrophic burden in households among developed countries [4, 36] . Thus, this study defined a catastrophic level of the financial burden as when household OPPH reached 10% of the total current household consumption. This threshold was deemed to be most representative of Canada's highincome economy. The COPPH were decomposed by type of healthcare payments: eyecare, pharmaceutical drugs, dental goods and services, physician services, non-physician services, and all other healthcare goods and services.
To measure statistically significant trends in the KPIs and incidence of COPPH over time, we performed a trend analysis by regressing the KPI (incidence of COPPH) on time (six points corresponding to the years from 2010-2015). Should this coefficient be statistically significant, a positive value indicates an increasing trend in progressivity (incidence of COPPH) over time, whereas a negative value indicates a decreasing trend.
Results
Out-of-pocket payments for healthcare in Canada Table 1 reports the mean equivalized OPPH for the total and urban and rural populations from 2010 to 2015. As reported in the table, the mean equivalized OPPH for the total sample and urban households dropped slightly over the first 2 years (from $2928 in 2010 to $2767 in 2012 for the total sample and from $2981 in 2010 to $2778 in 2012 for urban households) before rising and leveling off over the remaining study period ($2887 in 2015 for the total sample and $2884 in 2015 for urban households). On average, the mean equivalized OPPH for rural households was higher than the urban or total sample populations from 2010 to 2015; the mean equivalized OPPH for rural households rose only slightly over the same period (from $2750 to $2896). Progressivity in out-of-pocket payments for healthcare Table 2 reports the KPIs for OPPH in Canada from 2010 to 2015, 1 as well as for urban and rural regions of the country.
According to the table, the total KPI is negative in all years of the survey, indicating regressivity of OPPH throughout the study period. The time-series regression results indicated that there was a statistically significant decrease in the KPI (i.e., increase in regressivity) from 2010 to 2015 (Trend coefficient = − 0.0174, P value: 0.036). The results for urban and rural regions showcase similar results. The KPIs are negative for every year of the study in both urban and rural regions, indicating regressivity of OPPH from 2010 to 2015 regardless of urban or rural residential location. The average KPI was lower for rural regions than urban regions from 2010 to 2015. This means that OPPH in rural areas were more regressive on average than in urban areas. The KPI trends for both urban (Trend coefficient = − 0.004, P value = 0.284) and rural (Trend coefficient = − 0.002, P value = 0.896) regions do not suggest statistically significant changes in the KPI values over the study period. Table 3 reports the KPIs for OPPH from 2010 to 2015 by province. As reported in the table, every KPI was negative, suggesting that OPPH were regressive sources of healthcare financing in all provinces from 2010 to 2015. The provinces Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince Edward Island, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Nova Scotia had the lowest average KPIs for the study period, indicating higher levels of regressivity compared to the other provinces. Conversely, Alberta, Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia had the highest average KPIs for the study period, indicating lower levels of regressivity. The time trend analyses indicated that there were no discernable trends in regressivity within all provinces. Table 4 reports the proportion of households reaching the catastrophic threshold of 10% of total current household consumption in Canada and by urban and rural regions from 2010 to 2015. These results indicated that 7% of Canadian households affected by COPPH over the study period. The The two sets of data, before and after the data set break (as we discussed in the Data section) were verified as incompatible. These calculations are included in Table A.3. proportion of households affected by COPPH was higher in rural households (8%) than urban households (6%) over the period studied. 2 The results did not suggest a significant trend in the incidence of COPPH in Canada from 2010 to 2015. Table 5 reports the proportion of households reaching the 10% catastrophic threshold by province for 2010 to 2015. There are no considerable changes in the proportion of household face COPPH in any of the provinces over the study period. There was a variation in the proportion of households affected by COPPH, with Newfoundland, Ontario, and Alberta having the lowest and British Columbia being the highest. Figure 1 demonstrates the share of healthcare payment type from equivalized OPPH for the households with COPPH for the period between 2010 and 2015. From the figure, it is clear that pharmaceutical drugs and dental services represent the largest proportions of mean OPPH. Specifically, pharmaceutical drugs represented 44-63% and dental services represented between 15-24% of total mean equivalized OPPH from 2010 to 2015, respectively. Figure 2 highlights the share of healthcare payment type from equivalized OPPH for urban and rural regions. Eyecare (12-16%), dental (22-25%), and non-physician services (8-10%) represented a higher share of mean equivalized OPPH in urban households than rural households.
Catastrophic out-of-pocket payments for healthcare in Canada
The contribution of pharmaceutical drugs to mean OPPH was proportionately higher in rural households (54-68%) than urban households (45-52%). There was no discernable difference between urban and rural households in the share of physician and other OPPH categories.
Conclusions and discussion
In this paper, we empirically assessed the progressivity and catastrophic effect of out-of-pocket payments for healthcare in Canada over the period between 2010 and 2015. Our results indicated no significant trends in the mean equivalized OPPH for Canada as well as across its provinces over the study period. The results, however, highlighted a variation in the mean equivalized OPPH across provinces with British Columbia and Alberta having the highest mean equivalized OPPH and Newfoundland having the lowest. Our results indicated that OPPH were regressive in Canada from 2010 to 2015. In other words, more well-off Canadians pay proportionately less than their less well-off counterparts in OPPH to finance their respective healthcare needs. Contrary to Canada's healthcare financing mandate, Canadian households do not finance healthcare through out-of-pocket payments based on their ATP. From 2010 to 2015, the regressivity increased significantly in Canada. The finding of regressivity across the study period is consistent with other investigations of similar OECD countries, which found that OPPH tend to be regressive for jurisdictions with high-income economies [6, 31, 44, 45] . OPPH in Canada from 2010 to 2015 (− 0.118 to − 0.225) were found to be more regressive than direct payments for healthcare in Australia in 2009-10 (− 0.0535) [31] . OPPH in Canada were also more regressive than total OPPH in Portugal in 2010-11 (− 0.074) [46] . The regressivity of OPPH in Canada was found to be generally similar to those levels found in Denmark, Finland, France, Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland [44] . Comparison between these findings should be taken with caution because of the differences in study dates. With consistently regressive OPPH and significant growth in regressivity in recent years, these findings are concerning. The WHO [8, 9] has reported that OPPH act as a barrier to accessing different types of healthcare. These findings suggest that healthcare that falls outside of "medically necessary" hospital and physician services is inequitably financed by lower income Canadian households compared to more well-off households. Access to prescription drugs, dental care, and eyecare will reasonably be affected by those Canadians who cannot afford these services. When analyzed by provinces, the results indicated that OPPH were regressive in every province for every year of the study period. In other words, OPPH were regressive in Canada regardless of the province of residence. Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland and Labrador, Saskatchewan, and Nova Scotia had the lowest average KPIs (and, therefore, highest average regressivity) for the study period, indicating the higher levels of regressivity compared to the other provinces. Conversely, Alberta, Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia showed the highest average KPIs (and, therefore, lowest average regressivity) amongst the provinces. The relatively close values of regressivity across the individual provinces are an interesting finding in its own right. Provinces have full discretion to enact public policies regarding coverage of healthcare goods and services outside of those covered under Medicare [15] . For example, in the absence of a national pharmacare plan, a province may choose to cover specific subpopulations for certain drugs. Daw and Morgan [16] conducted a national review of provincial pharmacare policies and found coverage for seniors to be varied across the provinces, while several provinces enacted age-irrelevant catastrophic income-based coverage. It appears that regardless of individual discretion of enact equitable public policy or the creation of income-based coverage, OPPH remains regressive in every province.
OPPH were found to be a regressive source of funding in Canada regardless of the urban and rural residential location from 2010 to 2015. The average KPI was lower for rural regions than urban regions for the study period, indicating higher regressivity for OPPH for rural households than urban households. Interestingly, the four provinces that had the lowest (highest) levels of regressivity were also the provinces that have the highest (lowest) urban population's proportions. It is possible that higher proportion of rural residents in these provinces could have a negative effect on the progressivity of OPPH in these provinces, because rural households tend to have poorer social determinants of health and socio-economic indicators than their urban counterparts [19, 47] .
Since the estimated values of KPI in the provincial and urban/rural samples did not indicate any significant changes in the progressivity of OPPH, it may be that between-group (across the provinces and rural vs. urban) variations in OPPH contributed to the finding of an increasing trend in the regressivity of OPPH in Canada, but not in individual provinces or urban/rural regions. Taken together, the results suggest that the proportional contribution of residents of poor provinces (or rural areas) may be increased in comparison with the more well-off provinces.
Using a threshold of 10% of current total household consumption as an indication of catastrophic healthcare spending suggested that 7% of households in Canada faced catastrophic OPPH over the study period. Although both urban and rural households suffer very similar levels of COPPH from 2010 to 2015, rural households were found to have a consistently higher proportion of households affected by COPPH than urban households. Rural Canadian households tend to have lower total household income, and any level of OPPH would, therefore, represent a higher proportion of a given rural household's disposable income [12, 14] . The results also suggested a variation in the proportion of households affected by COPPH across provinces. The highest proportion of households that suffered COPPH during the study period was British Columbia, and the lowest proportions were Newfoundland, Ontario, and Alberta.
The breakdown of mean equivalized OPPH for households facing COPPH into six different categories of OPPH showed that pharmaceutical drugs and dental services represented the largest proportion of the mean OPPH for Canadian households compared to the other categories. The contribution of eyecare, dental, and non-physician services to the mean equivalized OPPH was higher in urban than rural households. Conversely, the contribution of pharmaceutical drugs to the mean equivalized OPPH was higher for rural households than urban households. These findings are also consistent with the previous empirical studies that have highlighted the burden of pharmaceutical drugs and dental services to Canadian households in the form of OPPH [12, 13, 15] . Pharmaceutical drug coverage is a major source of public scrutiny among politicians and policymakers in Canada. Prescription drugs are inconsistently covered under patchworks of public insurance coverage that, as the current study and others have shown, represent a major source of inequity of healthcare financing that disproportionately affects those Canadians from poorer households [12, 13, 15] . Although different provinces have individually attempted to extend coverage to certain subpopulations within their jurisdictions [12, 13] , COPPH related to pharmaceutical drugs expenses have continued to rise.
The empirical analyses in this study have certain limitations. First, we utilized six years of data to examine equity in OPPH in Canada, because the data before 2010 is not comparable to the recent available SHSs. The trend analyses findings would have been more robust if there were more comparable SHSs. Second, the Canadian territories (Yukon, Northwest Territories, and Nunavut) were excluded from the SHS 2010 to 2014; thus, we did not examine the progressivity and catastrophic effect of OPPH in the territories. The results of our study can be expanded to the territories in future studies, as the SHS began to collect information from the Canadian territories starting from SHS 2015. Third, since we assessed equity in OPPH only, future studies could be expanded to look at the equity in other healthcare funding sources such as general tax payments. Fourth, this paper only examined equity through the lens of healthcare financing and did not consider the equity of healthcare utilization in Canada. Other studies that examine the equity of healthcare utilization in Canada are needed to complete the picture of equity in healthcare in Canada.
The results of our study have important implications for policymakers at the federal and provincial levels. The regressivity of OPPH at the national and provincial levels provides evidence in support of policy reform that enhances financial risk protection for Canadians. Since COPPH primarily affect low-income and rural Canadian households, policies to enhance risk protection among these specific population (e.g., the expansion of government-subsidized health insurance for non-Medicare services) are required to improve equity in healthcare financing in Canada. The results of our study have implications for countries that have similar healthcare systems to Canada. Based on the Canadian experience, it would seem that publicly funded health insurance for "medically necessary" healthcare is not enough to ensure equitable financing of healthcare as OPPH that are not covered under any insurance may impose catastrophic and inequitable payments to citizens.
